banner



Chapter 1 A Separate Peace

Is a Permanent Peace Possible?

"If a better and saner globe is to grow out of the horror of futile carnage, men must acquire to notice their nation's glory in the victory of reason over brute instincts, and to feel the true patriotism which demands that our state should deserve admiration rather than extort fearfulness."

AP

I.

When the war began, certain writers, notably Mr. H. Grand. Wells, exhilarated by the romance of cracking events, and nonetheless believing themselves to be lovers of peace, invented the theory that this was 'a war to end war.' Both in England and in Germany, men who have professed a horror of war, merely who do not wish information technology thought that they oppose this state of war, have argued that their ain country is notorious for its love of peace, of which it has given repeated proofs laying information technology open to the charge of weakness; simply that it has been attacked by unscrupulous enemies, and must quell their ruthless pride before the world can be relieved from the dread of state of war. This language is non insincere, simply is the result of a very superficial analysis of the events and passions which led up to the disharmonize. Such an analysis, if allowed to pass unchallenged, is unsafe, since it leaves untouched all the misjudgment, suspicion, and pride out of which future wars, equally devastating, may be expected to grow in the course of the years. Something more than the mere victory of one political party is necessary for a secure peace, and something deeper than a relief in the enemy's wickedness is necessary if the nations are to move toward the goal. I shall attempt first an analysis of the causes of modern war, and then a discussion of ways of preventing future wars between civilized state.

The nowadays war springs from the rivalry of states. And the rivalry of states springs from certain erroneous beliefs, inspired and encouraged past pride and fright, and embodied in a political machinery intended to make the ability of a state quick, constructive, and terrible. If wars between civilized states are to cease, these behavior must be seen to be mistaken, pride must take a different form, fear must become baseless, and the machinery of international relations must no longer be designed solely for rivalry.

In surveying the larger causes of the state of war, nosotros may leave altogether out of account the diplomacy of the terminal fortnight in July. Since the decision of the Anglo-French entente in 1904 the war had been on the point of breaking out, and could accept been avoided simply by some radical change in the temper of nations and governments. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine had caused a profound estrangement between France and Germany. Russian federation and Germany became enemies through the Pan-Slavist agitation, which threatened the Austrian influence in the Balkans and even the very beingness of the Austro-Hungarian Land. Finally, the High german determination to build a powerful navy drove England into the artillery of Russian federation and France. Our differences with those 2 countries were suddenly discovered to be unimportant, and were amicably arranged without any difficulty. By a treaty whose important articles were kept undercover, the French withdrew their opposition to our occupation of Egypt, and we undertook to support them in acquiring Morocco, — a bargain which, from our ain point of view, had the advantage of reviving the hostility between France and Frg at a time when in that location seemed a hazard of its passing abroad. As regards Russian federation, our deep-rooted suspicions of its Asiatic designs were declared groundless, and we agreed to the independence of Tibet and the division of Persia, in return for an acquittance of our suzerainty in Afghanistan. Both these arrangements show that, if good-will and reason presided over international affairs, an adjustment of differences might have been made at any fourth dimension; as information technology is, nothing but fear of Deutschland sufficed to persuade us of the uselessness of our previous hostility to France and Russia.

No sooner had this grouping of the European powers been brought about than the Entente and the Alliance began a diplomatic game of watchful manœuvring against each other. Russia suffered a accident to her pride in the Austrian looting of Republic of bosnia and herzegovina; Federal republic of germany felt humiliated by having to acknowledge, though with compensation, the French occupation of Morocco. The starting time Balkan War was a gain to Russia; the second afforded some consolation to Austria. And then the game went on, with recurring crises and alternate diplomatic victories, offset for one side, then for the other.

In all this struggle, no one on either side thought for a moment of the welfare of the smaller nations which were the pawns in the struggle. The fact that Kingdom of morocco appealed to Federal republic of germany for protection against French aggression was non held to put England and France in the incorrect. The fact that the Persians—the intellectual aristocracy of the Moslem world—had freed themselves from the corrupt government of the Shah and were becoming liberal and parliamentary, was non regarded as any reason why their northern provinces should not be devastated by Cossacks and their southern regions occupied by the British. The fact that the Turks had for ages displayed a supremacy in cruelty and barbarism past torturing and degrading the Christians nether their rule was no reason why Germany should non, like England in sometime times, back up their tottering despotism by military and financial aid. All considerations of humanity and liberty were subordinated to the great game: first i side threatened war, then the other; at final both threatened at once, and the patient populations, incited cynically by lies and claptrap, were driven on to the blind work of butchery.

A world where such cruel absurdities are possible is not to be put right by a mere treaty of peace. War between civilized states is both wicked and foolish, and it will not cease until either the wickedness or the folly is understood by those who direct the policy of nations. Most men do not listen being wicked, and the few who do have learned ways of persuading themselves that they are virtuous. Merely, except in moments of passion, men do mind being foolish. There is more promise of preventing war in futurity by persuading men of its folly than by urging its wickedness. To a dispassionate ascertainment its folly is evident, but well-nigh observation is not dispassionate: unconsciously men tend to adopt the opinions which volition justify them in indulging their passions. Merely every bit a libertine, in order to alibi himself, comes to think that the women have no deep feelings, and then a militant patriot comes to think that the interests of his country are vitally opposed to those of some other land, in order that he may have an opportunity to indulge pride, have an opportunity to indulge pride, the desire for triumph, and the animalism of dominion. What the pacifist has to contend confronting is a system of false beliefs, inspired by unrecognized evil passions which are thought to be justified past the beliefs. If the behavior are seen to be fake, at that place is some promise that the passions may be recognized as evil. And the falsehood of the belief in the essential conflict of interests between nations is easily recognized by any candid mind.

Among men equally among all gregarious animals, there are two kinds of economic relation: coöperation and competition. There is coöperation when the activities which the one undertakes in his own interest tend to benefit the other; there is competition when they tend to injure the other. Neither coöperation nor contest need be conscious; it is not even necessary that either should exist enlightened of the being of the other. Merely in so far as they are witting, they bring into play quite different sets of feelings. On the one side we have affection, loyalty, gratitude; on the other, fear, hatred, triumph. The emotions out of which war springs result from a combination of the two groups: they are the emotions appropriate to coöperation against a common competitor. In the modern world, where men are grouped by states, these conditions are summed up in patriotism.

Coöperation and competition accept governed the lives of our ancestors since the days before they were man, and in the course of the struggle for beingness our emotional nature has adult so equally to respond deeply and instinctively to these ancient stimuli. At that place is in all men a disposition to seek out occasions for the practice of instinctive feelings, and it is this disposition rather than whatever inexorable economic or concrete fact, which is at the bottom of enmities betwixt nations. The conflicts of interest are invented to afford an excuse for feelings of hostility; but as the invention is unconscious, it is supposed that the hostility is brought about by some real disharmonize of involvement.

The cause of this absence of harmony between our instincts and our existent needs is the modern evolution of industry and commerce. In a savage community, where each family unit lives past its own labor, at that place is no occasion for peaceful coöperation in any group larger than the family. Merely there is oft occasion for warlike coöperation: if all the members of some other tribe can be killed, information technology is possible to appropriate their hunting-gournds and their pastures. In such a state of things, war is profitable to the victors, and the vanquished leave no descendants. The human race is descended from a long line of victors in war; for, although there take been but as many vanquished, they failed in early days to exit any posterity. The feelings which men now take on the discipline of war and international relations re feelings which were in agreement with facts, and so far as the victors were concerned, in those primitive internecine combats of savage tribes. But in the modern world our economical organization is more civilized than our emotions, and the conflicts in which we indulge exercise not really offer that prospect of gain which lets loose the brute inside u.s.a.. The brute within us refuses to confront this disappointing fact, and turns upon those who bring information technology frontwards with savage accusations of unmanliness or lack of patriotism. But it remains a fact none the less.

The international graphic symbol of our economic arrangement is due to division of labor, taking partly the form of exchange, partly the grade of multiplying stages in production. Consider some quite simple example: say a loaf of bread baked in Holland from Argentine wheat grown by the assistance of English agricultural machinery made from Spanish ore. Kingdom of the netherlands, Argentina, England, and Spain, all, through this loaf of breadstuff, accept an interest in each other's welfare; whatsoever misfortune to any one of the iv is likely to cause some injury to the other three. And so it happens that times of skilful trade and times of bad trade are both world-wide. Yet in spite of the fact that when Federal republic of germany is prosperous England is prosperous, and when Frg has hard times England has hard times, men persist, both in England and in Frg, in concentrating attending on the comparatively small amount of economical contest, to the exclusion of the very much greater amount of economical coöperation. It is though that if Germany were ruined England would be enriched, and vice versa. Yet every tradesman knows that the ruin of his customers is an injury to him, which cannot be compensated by the ruin of his competitors. Instinct makes us want a nation to hate, and diplomatists have decided that, for the terminal ten years, that nation should be Germany; and since nosotros hate Frg, we imagine her interests opposed to ours. But one moment's thought without hatred shows that the whole opposition is only imaginary.

The diplomatic conflict is even more unreal and disproportionate to any possibility of gain than the economic conflict. Autonomously from the satisfaction of a somewhat kittenish pride, what does information technology matter to either French republic or Germany which of them owns Morocco? Neglecting the fact that French republic had to promise the open door in society to win Germany's acquiescence, the extreme limit of possible reward would be the capture of the whole foreign merchandise of Morocco. This is a limit which cannot, in practice, exist reached, since, even with the well-nigh restrictive tariff, there will be some bolt which volition accept to be imported from elsewhere. Simply even if it could be reached, it is a mere fallacy to suppose that the necessary restrictions would be advantageous to France, England, after much experience, has abandoned the effort to impose any restrictions on strange trade in its Crown Colonies, because they hamper the development of colonies, diminish their purchasing ability, and in the long run hurt English language trade more than they benefit it. With every disposition to profit by injury to others, experience has taught usa that our ain profit is best secured past assuasive equal opportunities to other nations, and that injury to others, all the same delightful in itself, has to be paid for past a respective injury to ourselves. Only even if nosotros adopt, for the sake of statement, the view that a nation owning a colony can profit by securing the whole merchandise of that colony to itself, what proportion is there betwixt the gain and the cost?

In order that the French might acquire Kingdom of morocco, England and France, in 1905 and once again in 1911, were brought to the verge of war with Germany, causing huge increases in the French ground forces and the English language navy, embittering the relations of both with Germany, and producing a state of public feeling which made the nowadays war possible. A solemn international conference deliberated at Algeciras, and arrived at decisions which England and French republic regarded as 'scraps of paper.' Finally, Germany, as the price of abandoning its claims, caused a flake of African territory, at the expense of a similar increase of armaments, a similar exacerbation of public feeling, and an exhibition of bullying methods which prepared the whole world to view all Germany's proceedings with suspicion. And as everybody knows, the loss due to mere uncertainty, produced in industry and finance by a 'vigorous' policy, was so peachy that the German business world at terminal compelled the government to give fashion. And all this turmoil was over the question whether France should have the empty right to call Morocco 'French'!

Viewed every bit a means of obtaining any tangible proceeds, a diplomatic contest such equally that which was waged over Kingdom of morocco is a childish absurdity. The diplomatists who comport it, and the journalists who applaud their ridiculous activities, are ignorant men—ignorant, I mean, in all that is actually important to the welfare of nations. Their only training is in the kind of skill by which a equus caballus-dealer palms off a bad deal upon a foolish client, and in the cognition of personalities which is required in all games of intrigue. Only such training, though it had its importance in simpler times, grows less and less useful as the system of club becomes more than complex and as the interdependence of men in widely severed parts of the world increases. More and more the important facts are dry, statistical, impersonal; less and less are they of the sort that lends itself to expression in traditional literary form. Men's imaginations are governed to an extraordinary extent by literary tradition; the fact that the really important knowledge can be acquired only by industrious investigation makes it 'vulgar' and not such as whatsoever aristocratic diplomatist would condescend to know.

The economic absurdity of our diplomatic and armed services conflicts is non denied past well-informed advocates of international strife. They volition admit that, in a war between civilized states, even the victor can no longer hope to gain in wealth. Only they reply that such considerations are sordid, and that they, the warlike party, accept nobler ideals than mere money-grubbing. This is an even more preposterous absurdity than the pretence of trading advantages to exist obtained past victory. Let u.s. admit at in one case that the interest which most people felt in the Moroccan question was not, except in a very minor degree, an economic interest. But was it something higher than an economic interest?

The main thing involved in all such contests, and the matter that makes the boilerplate man tolerate them, is national pride. The Germans felt that France had failed to treat them with proper respect by not informing them officially of the Anglo-French understanding; the English and French felt the sending of the Panther to Agadir an act of aggression which must exist resented; the Germans felt Mr. Lloyd George'south high language at the Mansion House in 1911 a threat to which no great ability could yield with dignity. This is the nobler stuff with which the idealists of war confront the money-grubbing economists! Compared with this schoolboy want for cheap triumphs, money-grubbing is humane, enlightened, and noble. The man who builds upwards an industry confers benefits upon countless others in the course of pursuing his ain advantage: he becomes rich because he is doing something of existent utilize to the community. But the pride that wishes to humiliate, and the pride that can exist humiliated, by yielding trivial diplomatic advantages rather than risk war, are alike kittenish and brutal, springing from low ambitions, and enviously regarding one human's gain as consisting in another's loss. Diplomatic victory rests with the side most willing to take a chance war; and then long as men feel proud of their country on account of its victories, and not on account of its contributions to civilization and the welfare of mankind, so long they will feel humiliated when their country is reasonable, and elated when it is roughshod, overbearing, ready to plunge the earth into the chaos of armed conflict. As against this state of mind, the man who urges the economic loss involved, present, even in successful war, is a humane advocate of sane coöperation, not a human being blinded by sordid considerations to the supposed splendors of what is really the most degraded form of 'patriotism.'

The disease from which the civilized world is suffering is a complex ane, derived from the failure of men's instincts to keep pace with irresolute material conditions. Among savages, where in that location is no trade and picayune segmentation of labor, the only economic relation between different tribes is that of contest for the nutrient-supply. The tribe which attacks with most cunning and ferocity exterminates the greatest number of others, and leaves the largest posterity. Disposition to ferocity and cunning is, at this stage, a biological advantage; and the instincts of civilized men are those developed during this early stage. But through the growth of commerce and manufactures it has come almost that nine tenths of the interests of one civilized nation coincide with nine tenths of the interests of whatsoever other.

So long as the disposition to primitive ferocity is not excited, men are able to see their community of involvement, — as, for case, most men practice in America. Merely at that place remains in the background a readiness for enmity and suspicion, a capacity for all the emotions of the savage on the warpath, which tin can be roused by whatsoever skillful manipulator; and there remain many men who, from a brutal nature or from some underground outcome of cocky-interest, are unable to see that friendship betwixt nations is possible and that hostility has lost whatever raison d'être it once possessed. And so the one-time rivalries, at present become an unmeaning and murderous futility, go on unchecked, and all the fantabulous heroism of war is wasted on a tragic absurdity.

Two.

The old methods have brought us to the nowadays disaster, and new and better methods must be establish. And then much is agreed on all easily.

But as soon equally we attempt to specify ameliorate methods, disagreement breaks out, partly from conflict of opinion concerning the facts which have brought most the present state of affairs, partly from desire to detect a heroic solution which shall one time for all make war incommunicable by some mechanical arrangement.

The steps to exist taken for securing a lasting peace autumn into three categories: (1) the conditions of peace; (2) the subsequent machinery for adjusting international disputes; (3) measures for producing, throughout Europe, a more sane, well-informed, and pacific public opinion.

(1) Ix men out of ten, in all the combatant nations, consider, or at least considered when the war broke out, that the atmospheric condition of peace are the simply question of importance. Nine out of 10 Englishmen believe, or believed, that England, French republic, and Russian federation are essentially peace-loving countries; that they made every conceivable endeavor for the preservation of peace; and that the one thing necessary to secure the permanent peace of the globe is that they should blast the armed services power of Deutschland and Republic of austria. Nine out of x Germans believe, or believed, that Germany and Austria are essentially peace-loving countries; that while they were struggling to preserve the peace, Russia, secretly encouraged by England, treacherously mobilized under comprehend of negotiations between the Arbiter and the Kaiser; and that the i thing necessary to secure the permanent peace of the globe is that Federal republic of germany and Austria should nail the military power of the Allies.

These opposing views are but melodramatic: no nation is quite blackness, and none is quite white, merely all are of varying shades of gray. Similar every one else in Europe, I think my own nation of the lightest shade of greyness; but no participator in the game of Alliance and Entente which statesmen accept played for the by ten years, ought to flatter itself that information technology is wholly unspotted. And in any case, as a solution, the consummate destruction of the enemy has the defect of being impossible. England and Germany will both exist subsequently the state of war; if they fought each other for five centuries, like England and French republic, they would still both be. This fact is starting time to be realized on both sides, and to compel even the virtually bellicose to seek some manner by which they can larn to endure each other's existence with equanimity. What is wanted is a alter of heart, leading to a change of political methods; and victory or defeat must be considered in the calorie-free of their power of producing a change of centre.

From this betoken of view, it is important that no nation should make such great gains equally to feel that it was worth while going to war, and that none should endure such humiliating losses as to be impelled to revenge. The result of 1870 was the worst possible from the point of view of mankind. The Germans were encouraged in militarism past success, the French were goaded into militarism by the intolerable shame of defeat and dismemberment. Whatsoever happens at the peace, there should be no new Alsace-Lorraines: any transfer of territory should be such equally tin can be recommended to neutral opinion on the ground of the wishes of the inhabitants. Then far as the West is concerned, it may be reasonably hoped that this status will be carried out; simply in the East it is to be feared that none of the combatants volition respect it. No ane believes that any part of the Turkish Empire will be immune any vox in deciding its fate; only it must be admitted that the Turks, throughout their history, have washed as little to deserve consideration equally any nation on earth.

(2) But changes of territory are the least important part of what may be hoped from the peace. In all nations every sane man and woman will desire a completely new organization in international affairs. The just men who volition desire to prolong the present system are statesmen, sensational journalists, and armament-makers—the men who profit by slaughter, either in credit or in cash, without running whatsoever risk of being slaughtered themselves. Since these men will control the actual Congress, they will be able to postpone the inauguration of a happier historic period, unless America undertakes the title of flesh against the warring governments. All humane people in Europe would wish America to participate: if possible, they would wish the Congress to take place in the neutral temper of Washington, with Mr. Wilson every bit its president. The governments may oppose this plan, from the wish of officials to retain power in their own hands, and of combatants to avoid having to hear the vox of reason. But public opinion is against the governments in this question, though for the moment it has difficulty in expressing itself.

New methods in international affairs are required, non in the interests of one side or the other, only in the interests of mankind, lest civilization and humanity should perish from the world. It would exist disastrous if new methods were imposed past the victors upon the vanquished as part of the humiliation of defeat: they ought to be adopted by all, at the proffer of neutrals, as an escape from the tragic entanglement which has dragged a horrified Europe, as though by the compulsion of an external fate, into a cataclysm not desired beforehand past i homo in a hundred in any of the nations involved in the struggle. In every nation, men believe they are fighting for the defense of home and state against wanton aggression; for they know that they themselves have not desired war, and they know or doubtable the sins of foreign governments while they are ignorant of the sins of their own. In every nation, when this war comes to an terminate, men will welcome whatever means of avoiding the hazard of another such war in the hereafter.

Most of the friends of peace are agreed in advocating some kind of international council to take cognizance of all disputes between nations and to urge what it regards as a only solution. But it is non easy to agree either every bit to the powers or as to the limerick of the council.

The council ought not to be composed merely of diplomatists. A diplomatist represents national prestige, and his credit among his confrères depends upon his skill in securing supposed advantages for his own nation. He focusses in his ain person the spirit of rivalry between states, which is the chief obstruction to internationalism. The mental atmosphere in which he lives is that of the eighteenth century, with its 'Balance of Power' and other shibboleths. Classification by nations is but one mode of classifying mankind, but the diplomatic machine ignores all other ways. The world of finance, the world of learning, the globe of socialism—to accept simply three examples—are international, each of neat importance in its own style, each having certain interests which cut right beyond the divisions of states. If each nation appointed to the council, not merely a diplomatist, simply also a financier, a representative of learning, and a champion of labor, at that place would often be cross-divisions, and the voting would not always exist by nations. International interests, as opposed to merely national advantage, would take some adventure of a hearing in such a council, and it might occasionally happen that the welfare of civilization would be the decisive consideration. Foreign policy has remained everywhere the sectional domain of an aristocratic clique. What they take made of it, we come across. It is time to secure a less ignorant and less prejudiced conduct of diplomacy by the admission of the democracy to an active administrative share.

The deliberations of the quango should be public, and it should turn down to regard as binding whatsoever treaty, agreement, or agreement, of which the terms had been kept secret. By means of secrecy, an air of mystery and hocus-pocus is preserved, of which the sole use and purpose is to go on ability in official hands, and to prevent the intrusion of common sense into the arcana of diplomacy. The public is hoodwinked by the balls that secrecy is essential to national security. Hitherto, on this plea, even the about democratic countries of Europe accept handed over their destinies blindfold to men who have abused their trust by policies diametrically opposed to what their followers desired. Only publicity tin forestall a repetition of this offense.

In urging that men who are not professional diplomatists ought to have role in the international council, I am not intending to suggest that diplomatists, as individuals, are any worse than other men, but only that their training, their traditions, their way of life, and the fact that they represent the national involvement to the exclusion of all other considerations, must tend to close their minds to an lodge of ideas which lies outside the telescopic of their official duties. Fifty-fifty men who are wholly estimable in individual life volition be governed in their political ideas by the interests which they stand for. The secretary of the Automobile Association—I speak hypothetically, since I exercise non know who he is—may exist an ardent patriot, and anxious, as an private, to bear his share of the expense of the navy, but he will infallibly protestation when information technology is proposed to put a tax on petrol. The editor of the Licensed Victualler'southward Gazette may be a zealous temperance man in his individual capacity, merely every bit an editor he is spring to raise an outcry when any fresh brunt is placed upon 'the merchandise.' And then a diplomatist may, during his holidays, exist an international pacifist, simply in his working hours he will struggle to obtain small advantages for his country, even by threatening war if necessary. This is the inevitable result of the interest which he represents, and can be counteracted only past men who correspond interests which conflict less with those of civilisation in general.

Should the powers of the council include military intervention for the enforcement of its awards? Very strong arguments may be urged on both sides.

Information technology is causeless that, when a dispute arises, the council will at once invite the powers concerned to submit to its arbitration, and that, if i party expresses willingness to bide by its award while the other does not, information technology will throw any weight it possesses confronting the intractable party. It should besides have the power of examining questions probable to crusade disputes in the future, and of suggesting such adjustments and compromises every bit many seem just. But if its dominance is flouted, shall it rely upon moral strength solitary, or shall it accept power to invoke the armed support of all those neutrals which transport delegates to it?

In favor of armed intervention, information technology may be urged that otherwise the council volition be futile, and will afford no security against an aggressive military power. It will therefore not allay panics, prevent wars, or tend to diminish armaments. If, on the other hand, neutrals can be relied upon to be willing to threaten armed intervention, and if their intervention would always secure an overwhelming preponderance of forcefulness on one side, then the mere threat would be sufficient, and actual war would be prevented.

But this argument involves many doubtful hypotheses, and is perchance inspired less by a sober review of the facts than by the wish to notice a short cut to universal peace. Unless about all the powers sincerely desire peace, an brotherhood among the more bellicose powers might be potent enough to flout all the others, and in that instance the only consequence of the council would exist to make the state of war world-wide. Also it is much to exist feared that neutrals could not be trusted to intervene by force of arms in a dispute in which they had no interest beyond the want to preserve the peace: the whole arrangement would be in danger of breaking down but when it was most needed. The most pacific powers—notably the United states—would probably refuse birthday to enter a system entailing such vast and manifold obligations. And within each nation, the necessity of existence constantly prepared to go to war would run counter to the wishes of peaceful people, although it is from such people, although it is from such people that the scheme would have to derive its support, since its aim would be the prevention of war. For these reasons, it does non seem desirable at present that the decisions of the international council should be enforced past military intervention.

I practise not think the decisions of the council would accept no weight if they rested upon moral force alone. The efforts made past both sides in the nowadays war to persuade the The states of the justice of their cause bear witness how highly the sympathy of neutrals is valued, when at that place is hardly a thought of their abandoning neutrality. And the mere being of an impartial tribunal, to which each side could yield without loss of dignity, would in most cases suffice to prevent the diplomatic deadlock which precedes war. Public stance, which at present has no ways of hearing whatever unbiassed statement, would be powerfully influenced by an authoritative award, and the pacific forces in the countries concerned could bring force per unit area to bear on the governments to bow to the decisions of the council. If the pacific forces were strong, this pressure would probably be sufficient; if not, no system could make peace secure. For, in the last resort, peace can be preserved simply if public opinion desires peace in most of the great nations.

(3) Far more important than any question of machinery is the problem of producing in all civilized nations such a horror of state of war that public opinion will insist upon peaceful methods of settling disputes. When this war ends, it is probably that every nation in Europe will experience such an intense weariness of the struggle that there will be little likelihood of a not bad war for another generation. The problem is, and then to alter men's standards and outlook that, when the weariness has passed away, they shall non fall back into the sometime bad way, simply shall escape from the nightmare into a happier world of free coöperation.

The outset affair to make men realize is that modernistic war is an absurdity also equally a criminal offence, and that information technology can no longer secure such national advantages as, for instance, England secured by the Vii Years' State of war. After the present war, information technology should be easy to persuade fifty-fifty the most ignorant and high-placed persons of this truth.

But it is fifty-fifty more necessary to change men's conceptions of 'celebrity' and 'patriotism.' Beginning in childhood, with the school textbooks of history, and continuing in the press and in common talk, men are taught that the essence of 'celebrity' is successful robbing and slaughter. The most 'glorious' nation is the one which kills the greatest numbers of foreigners and seizes the greatest extent of foreign territory. The most 'patriotic' citizen is the ane who most strongly opposes any effort at justice or mercy in his land's dealings with other countries, and who is least able to conceive of mankind as all ane family, struggling painfully from a condition of universal strife toward a society where beloved of one's neighbor is no longer though a crime. The division of the word into nations is a fact which must be accepted, but there is no reason to take the narrow nationalism which envies the prosperity of others and imagines information technology a hindrance to our own progress. If a meliorate and saner world is to abound out of the horror of futile carnage, men must larn to find their nation'due south glory in the victory of reason over animate being instincts, and to feel the truthful patriotism which demands that our country should deserve adoration rather than extort fear. If this lesson tin can be taught to all, commencement with the children in the schools, we may hope for a lasting peace, and the machinery for securing information technology will grow out of the universal desire. So long as hate and fear and pride are praised and encouraged, war can never become an impossibility. But there is now, if men take the backbone to use it, an awakening of heart and mind such every bit the earth has never known before: men see that war is wicked and that war is foolish. If the statesmen will play their role, past showing that state of war is not inevitable, there is hope that our children may live in a happier world, and look back upon united states with the wondering pity of a wiser age.

Chapter 1 A Separate Peace,

Source: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1915/03/is-a-permanent-peace-possible/555302/

Posted by: williamscoatseardeas.blogspot.com

0 Response to "Chapter 1 A Separate Peace"

Post a Comment

Iklan Atas Artikel

Iklan Tengah Artikel 1

Iklan Tengah Artikel 2

Iklan Bawah Artikel